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The impact of pressures on corporations is harder to gauge 
because a direct causal relationship between pressures and 
corporate responses cannot be drawn. It is clear that many 
corporations ta...~e their sharehold€rs' concerns over South 
Africa seriously ••• Many (U.S.) companies openly admit that 
these burdens are disproportionate to the business they do 
in South Africa .•• Banks speak of scattered customer campaigns 
to withdraw funds because of their loans to South Africa ••• 
These and the "hassle factor" they represent have played an 
important role in the sharp d1cline in .American lending to South Africa in recent years. 
Lacking a large constituency, most of the anti-apartheid 2 groups are simply unable to strike fear into official hearts. 
The work of anti-apartheid groups throughout the world is presently at a 
critical juncture. There is no doubt that the last several years have seen a 
growth, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in the work of anti-apartheid 
and solidar~~Y activists everywhere. Throughout the United States and France--
two bastions of explicit corporate support and more subtle governmental support 
for the Pretoria regime--new and substan~ive groups are mobilizing liberation 
support efforts. These efforts are growing, in spite of a past in both countries 
where anti-apartheid work was largely confined to small groups representing 
narrow social and economic groupings. In France, coalition efforts with signifi-
cant trade union leadership and participation can now think seriously of 
mobilizing "100,000 French people against the financing of apartheid." In the 
United States, in November 1978, a tremendous organizing effort led students 
throughout the State of California to march and picket more than five hundred 
branches of the Bank of America--a transnational lending institution which had 
loaned over 188 million dollars to South African entities. 
Transnational corporations and Western capitalist governments continue, 
however, to play an increasingly critical role in keeping the apartheid 
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regime afloat. As former Senator Dick Clark (Iowa) rather conservatively 
summarized in January 1978: 
Collectively, U.S. corporations operating in South Africa 
have made no significant impact on either relaxing apartheid 
or in establishing company policies which would offer a limited 
but nevertheless important model of multinational responsi-
bility. Rather, the net effect of American investment has 
been to str~ngthen the economi~ and ~litary self-sufficiency 
of South Africa's apartheid regime ••• 
Or as a recent U.N. Economi~ and Social Council Report pointed out, looking 
specifically at the role of transnational corporations (-TNC's) in South Africa's 
mining industry: 
Since the end of the Second World War, however, South Africa's 
mining sector has drawn direct investment from TNC's because 
of its mineral wealth, the favorable governmental policies 
toward mining companies, and the existence of a large non-
unionized and disciplined labour force.* 
The same report also demonstrated that, not only do U.S. (as well as other) 
TNC's like being in South Africa, but they plan to stay for quite some time: 
A 1977 United States government survey of capital investment 
plans by majority-owned affiliates of U.S.-based TNC's in the 
.South African mining industry shows that capital expenditures 
are expected to be $57 million in 1979--mainly for uranium 
and copper projects--which would be three times the 1978 total 
of $20 million.5 
Thus our work is cut out for us. But first, let us approach a more vigorous 
discussion of that work by asking, where have we been? What have we been doing? 
So much of apartheid's appeal for TNC's is based 6n the availability of cheap 
labor. It is a point which we in the anti-apartheid movement should expose, 
explain, and condemn much more. As W.E.B. DuBois pointed out so, so long ago, 
"In Africa today, the lure to war, the temptation to murder and violence, is 
greater than formerly in Asia. Africa has more strong, cheap labor, more 
capable of being hannnered into a modern industrial proletariat by brute force." 
(Introduction to Davidson, Basil. Report on Southern Africa, 1952.) 
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Space does not permit a full discussion of the historical development of 
the anti-apartheid movement and/or the solidarity groups for the Southern Africa 
liberation movements. To attempt such _a project for all the various international 
'' groups would be a formidable task. Moreover, others have done this critical 
6 
work far more competently than this author could ever manage. 
Still, let us remind ourselves of two aspects of the question: 1) that the 
roots of the international anti-apartheid novement go back to the early twentieth 
century; and 2) that there has, and must be, an _intimate and dialectical relation-· 
ship between anti-apartheid work and the struggle being waged by the national 
liberation forces themselves. It was in 1948, for instance, that the first 
exposes were made of the role of international capital in shoring up a South 
African regime shaken by the 1948 miners' strikes. And, in pamphlets issued 
during that period by Alphaeus Hinton, W.E.B. Du.Bois, Paul Robeson and the 
Council on African Affairs, there went out a resounding cry for international 
action against banks then making loans to the new Nationalist government. 
An illustration of the second aspect, the relationship between the struggle inside 
South Africa and solidarity work outside, is the extent to which the student 
divestment movement--both· in Britain and the United States--has peaked and waned 
in almost direct proportion to the pac~ of events inside South Africa • . In 1976, 
1977 and early 1978--as the Soweto struggle sharpened, as the students' school 
boycotts, the ensuing trials, arrests and deaths all grew--more and more campuses 
activated toward the objective of cutting their schools' financial linkages to 
South Africa{these largely indirect, through investments in South African-related 
TNC's). What has all of this activity, especially that in the United States, 
meant? What is its potential for the future? At this juncture, it is imperative 
that we be both honest and critical, yet comradely. As the renowned and 
( 
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brilliant revolutionary and theoretician, Amilcar Cabral often said, let us 
"tell no lies, claim no easy victories." It is true that divestment, or the 
;' 
sale or stock, has become a major anti-apartheid rallying point on a number 
of campuses. , But too often it has been just that. Consistently, there has 
been a failure to employ divestment as only one of many tactics. On campus 
after campus, student anti-apartheid groups have not gone beyond the "divest 
now" struggle to other efforts, such as exposing and publicizing collaborative 
research--supportive of apartheid--going on. at the same campuses. Too often 
there have not been educational campaigns, explaining the liberation movements, 
which should necessarily accompany the divestment work. The lack of educational 
campaigns means, of course, a lack of substantive material support as well. 
Sadly, U.S. campuses, with the potential to mobilize hundreds of thousands of 
dollars (given most schools' large activities and entertainment fees) for concrete 
assistance like blankets, clothing, radios, etc., contribute relatively little 
to material support. This short sightedness, often a result, of inexperience, 
is being corrected on many campuses. However, this short-sightedness is also 
the product of a political situation in which one's tactic becomes the objective. 
Instead of divestment work being one of a number of programmatic goals, it 
(divestment or as in some recent cases, partial divestment or even re-divestment8) 
becomes the entire program. 
In my view, shareholder activism shares the same characteristic. By "share-
holder activism" I mean the enterprise of promoting, lobbying and voting 
corporate proxies concerning South Africa, largely through institutional 
investors (originally churches, but increasingly schools, universities ~nd 
pensions funds) all of which culminates in either disclosure, non-expansion 
or withdrawal resolutions at the annual meetings. In the dozen or so years 
I 
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that shareholder activism has been around, it has succeeded--about this 
there is no doubt--in publicizing issues which otherwise would · have received 
no attention~ But it is now 1979, and the issue of corporate collaboration 
with apartheid South Africa has gained an enhanced visibility. 
Today shareholder activism is a tactic pursued by a minority and necessarily 
privileged. sector of people. Few Americans have either the resources or the 
time to appear at corporate annual meetings. And more importantly, an 
inordinate a.mount of the resources available to anti-apartheid activists 
is being consumed by solely shareholder activist organizations. Fewer and 
fewer American churches, proportionately speaking, are supporting the 
"grass roots" door to door type of work being done by most small-budgeted, 
small-staffed, anti-apartheid organizations. 
These statements should not be construed as a rustication order for shareholder 
activism. Rather, they are suggestions that shareholder activism now assume 
a secondary role to the greater task of mass-oriented educational and mobiliza- , 
tional work. ~ther, that the annual pilgrimages for the shareholder voting--
many of which have brought record voting percentages in the last two years9--
should be coordinated with mass activity. As five or six individuals or 
institutional investors vote on the inside, five or six hundred should be 
marching on the outside. 
There is an extremely important aspect to what I am saying here. In the 
United States, Britain, France, Belgium, Switzerland, throughout the West, 
and in the Caribbean and Latin America as well, there is a vast social and 
economic formation which is all too often neglected in our work as anti-
• 
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apartheid activists. This, in spite of the fact that it is often that very 
grouping, be it class or racial group (migrant workers in France, blacks in 
1' 
America or West Indians in Britain), that is objectively and materially most 
oppressed by the very transnational "locomotives" which are the lifeline of 
the apartheid system. 
A singularly grim failure of shareholder activism thus far is that it fails 
to impact and help mobilize those elements of the population--especially 
in the .U.S.--who are the most capable of putting pressure on the TNC's . that 
are collaborating with South Africa. Years ago, we knew, just as the liberal 
corporate spokesman, Waldemar Nielse~, of the African American Institute once . 
said, "the issues of Southern Africa, let it be plainly recognized, once the 
Vietnam agony is finished, are going to be the next foreign policy focus of 
the moral indignation of youth, the Negoes and the American left." By and 
large, the information generated for shareholder voter education currently 
does not sufficiently reach the groupings that could make Nielsen be a more 
accurate prophet. 
A brief illustration may help to elucidate this point even further. In the 
early spring of 1978, Chicago activists held a meeting with the Motorola 
company, a TNC headquartered in nearby Schaumberg, Illinois. At the 
meeting, when a questioner asked about their activities in South Africa--
which included selling radios for South African police vehicles--com.pany 
executives defended themselves by saying that they weren't selling the . 
South African police their best equipment, only their second-best equipment! 
They kept their best equipment for the Chicago police department! Chicago 
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has one of the highest police/civilian kill ratios in the entire United States. 
Additionally, the ongoing local campaign against police abuse, the memory of 
the 1968 Democratic convention, and the Decefuber 1969 sunrise assassination 
of Black Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark Clark are all events emblazoned in 
the memories of black Chicagoans. Thus, a linkage which was objectively 
pr,esent should have been built upon and developed so that the discussion 
then being held with Motorola would have had an active mass base. 
But the failure to develop a mass constituency for anti-apartheid work in 
western countries(Sweden, Britain and Canada are a few notable exceptions) 
is not just to be found in the arena of shareholder activism •. Rather, it 
is a criticism that could be equally applied to anti-~2'ugerrand work, 
anti-mercenary recruitment, university divestment campaigns, and the bank 
withdrawal campaigns. Ironically, more and more concrete evidence is emerging 
which indicates that the broad masses of people are prepared to be mobilized 
into a more activist stance against the apartheid regme. A recent survey by 
the Council on Foreign Relations reported that "[f]orty percent of the (U.S.) 
public favors the United States taking an active stance in opposing apartheid 
in South Africa."11 More significantly, however, the interventionist Council, 
famed for its role in formulating Vietnams all over the world, substantiated 
what many have been stating for a long tme when it said: 
In most respects, these elite responses parallel those of 
the American people as a whole ••• The · greatest divergence 
between our elite respondents and the American people as 
a whole comes in the question of how best to deal with 
South Africa, where the elites appear less willing to 
adopt stern measures. Demographic analysis of the 
national Harris poll used in Table XI suggests that 
this divergence is not fortuitous. In that poll skilled 
workers and union members were more likely to. approve 
strong measures than white collar workers, executives, 
and professionals, though these last two groups, like 
our res ondents were strongest in their expressions 
of opposition to apartheid in principle. emphasis added) 
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Thus, the Council indicates what might happen. "What-might-have-beens", 
however, do not make history. Change comes, not from potential but from 
actual mobilization. For too long we in westepn anti-apartheid movements 
have relied· upon a hypothetical "enraged and organized" constituency rather 
than the real thing. 
There have been of late, substantive successes in international anti-apartheid 
work. Work in the sports arena, the very existence of student anti-apartheid 
movements, especially in the U.S., the internationally coordinated bank withdrawals 
campaign, these are but a few examples • . What seems to have most enhanced our 
effectiveness has been the amount of coordination and timing of actions. The 
fact that Canadian, U.S., British and other European groups have consistently, 
over the past three years, coordinated their actions against the world's 
multinational lending institutions is probably the major reason that there are 
some victories13 to discuss in terms of pressuring banks to sto~ their credit 
lifeline to apartheid. 
The optimal situation would seem to be when the campaigns of anti-apartheid 
groups can be coordinated with steps taken by governments. In March of 1978, 
the Nigerian government ordered all public sector agencies to close their 
accounts with Ba.relay's Bank of Nigeria because of the parent Barclay's 
large portfolio of credit to South Africa. At the same time, the Nigerian 
Foreign Affairs Commissioner stated that several other companies which had 
not complied with a stipulation by the Nigerian governmentt that they reduce 
their business in South Africa, had already been blacklisted by the Nigerian 
-9-
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government. At the same time, at least one other independent African 
government was actively exploring the transfer of several of its major 
accounts in New York City from offending banks to non-offending banks. 
What might have made the ,international bank campaign more effective would 
have been if Nigeria had taken ·its action in line with one of the days of 
withdrawal that the bank campaign was promoting. 
A major direction in which the anti-apartheid movement must move is toward 
more coordinated international activities. Just as TNC's obtain some of 
their power from the fact of their being based out of various countries, 
so too should anti-apartheid forces construct more multinational, coordinated 
eampaigns. 
It is true, of course, that the anti-apartheid forces, most particularly the 
non-governmental organizations, cannot marshall the resources available to 
the TNC's. But there are certain specific and concrete steps we can take 
in spite of our limited resources. Some of them are: 
1. create or support one magazine which can provide a comprehensive 
and current updating .on the various activities going on in different countries; 
2. prepare more work on the TNC's jointly with various targeted national 
and international constituencies. In other words, when a piece is being done 
on Ford Motor Company's role in South Africa, let us solicit and jointly 
compile information that depicts Ford in Britain, Ford in Mexico, Ford in 
the U.S. as well; 
3. organize some tours of anti-apartheid activists from different countries 
to other countr!es so as to better appreciate the situation different campaigns 
are facing; 
)\ 
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4. continuing the tradition of international days of withdrawal, 
organize international fund raising days to support countries like 
Mozambique and Angola which are so much the target of South African 
aggression; , · 
5. in view of the important role media coverage plays in organizing 
campaigns, let us exchange more information on journalists and the media 
generally (print and electronic), so that different anti-apartheid groups, 
African governments, and the liberation movements have a better idea of 
who is who in the international media; 
--- --- -------- -
6.· organize an international working conference of anti-apartheid 
groups and solidarity organizations to weigh strategy and tactics questions 
for the upcoming period of the 1980's. 
- --- ------ - -
The period ahead is one which is going to be replete with :obfuscations and 
grey zones. Already, the South Africa Foundation and various corporate allies 
like the Ford Foundation, are actively promoting the moderate solution 
candidates, the Muzorewas of South Africa. Lucy Mvubelo, Helen Suzman, Gatsha 
Buthelezi, Nicholas Wiehahn, Pieter Koornhof, all are now riding lecture 
circuits and making television appearances in various western capitals. 
As sectors of the South African ruling class push these activit~es more and 
announce more reforms, it is going to be increasingly difficult to mobilize 
against the ?outh African apartheid system • . Still, there are certain vulnerabilities 
which can be worked on with regard to TNC collaboration with apartheid. First, 
there is the necessity of TNC's maintaining a good image. They compete in the 
market place. They must continue to do so. One objective -0f our work should 
be to link that public image as extensively as possible with the ~rutality and 
violence which is inherent in the apartheid system. Recently, 2400 members N 
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of various U.S. unions and groups supporting the Amalgamated Clothing and 
Textile Workers Union J.P. Stevens organizing campaign formed a two mile long 
"human billboard" denouncing the J.P. Stevens textile company. 15 On the 
surface it seemed just a protest but in fact it was strategically geared . 
to put so much pressure on one ·corporate executive (from the Sea.men's Savings 
Bank) as to get him to resign. It was· thus one of several steps to isolate 
the J.P. Stevens Company from the financial and corporate community. 
A second vulnerable area of apartheid' s TNC collaborators_ is the fact of their 
domestic pratice. All of the TNC's with operations in South Africa also have 
home bases. In our work, we should constantly tie together their involvement in 
apartheid with their _exploitative patterns at home. We should try, e.g. to 
relate the South African apartheid system to peopl~'s generalized concerns 
about economic security (pensions), about a nuclear war/catastrophe, about 
having healthy and safe working conditions. These are several of the concerns 
which people in western metropoles will be agitated about throughout the 1980's. 
It is making these connections which is going to lead to greater and greater 
mass participation. People, be they Scottish or Caribbean, who have not 
traveled to, lived or worked in Southern Africa, people weighed down with 
the escalating war they wage daily to live are not going to identify with 
or work on behalf of Southern African people~w~olly out of moral empathy. 
Rather, it is when people perceive it to be in their material interests that 
they will act. Everyone, as Amilcar Cabral used to emphasize, so much "wants 
to see their lives move forward," to see better lives for their children. 
Recently, a little known commentator, Lindsey Phillips, pointed out, quite 
accurately, I think: 
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South Africa is in some ways a test case for the 
international connnu.nity: the many factors of race 
and class, national liberation and foreign capital, 
justice and _socialism, are all playing themyglves 
out in South Africa in their starkest form. 
In l978, a more renowned figure, Zbignew Brezinski, the Carter Administration's 
National Security 6l\.dvisor, talking with South African Minister Roelof Botha 
made a comment somewhat along the same lines when Botha said to him that 
South Africa needed more time for its reform initiatives. Botha said further 
that South Africa had a "mission on the African continent~ •• a mission to 
make the continent great." According to Botha, at this point Brezinski 
paused, "there was a deadly silence," and then Brezinski said: 
You moved us deeply, I would like to agree with 
every word you said. But I fear you will not 
have the time for your enterprise. You might 
be run over by the locomotive of history. 
(Brezinski hesitated, then added:) The same 
might happen to us. You and we might be 
run over by the locomotive of history.17 
The message is the same in both these comments. South Africa, its future, is 
in the living rooms of the West. It is an issue which is not going to go 
away. It is in~egral to the most basic fibers of the world capitalist system. 
and that system's patterns of social, especially racial, relations. 
South Africa will be here and we must do something about it. This perspective 
is one we should adopt, one we should underscore in our organizing. 
,, 
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